
The Territorial Dispute Over Dokdo
Dokdo:
Dokdo's location and distance from nearest
landfalls. |
The government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) designated Dokdo
'Natural Monument No. 336' in 1982. The government generally does not
allow private individuals to visit the island, but as of early 2005, the
Korean government is expected to further lift restrictions on civillian visits
to the islets.Dokdo consists of two tiny rocky islets surrounded by 33 smaller
rocks. The Dokdo islets are located about 215 kilometers off the eastern
border of Korea and 90 kilometers east of South Korea's Ullung Island. The
islets are an administative part of Ullung Island, North Kyongsang province,
under the control of the Department of Ocean and Fisheries. Dokdo is
also 157 kilometers northwest of Japan's Oki Islands. Its exact position
is 37¡Æ 14' 45" N and 131¡Æ 52' 30" E. Of the two Islets that make up
Dokdo, Suhdo (the West islet) is a steep-sided rock about 100 meters high,
while Dongdo (the East islet) is 174 meters high. The approximate total
surface area of Dokdo is 0.186 square kilometers (56 acres).
Both rocks, about 200 meters distant, are the remains of an ancient
volcanic crater and are a refuge for Petrels and black-tailed gulls and
several, partly endemic plants.
The first historical references to the island were cited
in Korean documents, which make reference to them as a part of an independent
island state known as "Usankuk" (Ullung Island) which was incorporated into
the Korean Shilla Dynasty in 512 AD. Dokdo was first registered on
charts in Europe after a French expedition under the leadership of Jean F.G.
Perouse travelled to the East Sea/Sea of Japan in May of 1787, naming Ullung
Island as "Dagelet", for a French astrologer, and Dokdo as "Boussole", after
the name of one of the ships on the expedition. It was not until 1849,
when French whale-hunters gave the name of their ship to the islets, that
Dokdo began to be called "Liancourt Rocks". Other names have been
ascribed to Dokdo ("Manalai and Olivutsa Rocks" by a Russian warship in 1854,
and "Hornet Rocks" by the British, after one of their ships, the Hornet in
1855) but the name "Liancourt Rocks" is the only one of these names that is
commonly seen on (usually older) English-language maps and sea charts
published since 1910. The island was known to Koreans as "Kajido" (Sealion
Island), "Sambongdo" (Three-Rock Island) and "Sokdo". Since at least 1881, the
island has been called Dokdo by Koreans, meaning "Lonely Island" or "Rock
Island", depending on the Sino-Korean character that one uses for the word,
"Dok". Since at least 1905, the islets have been known by the Japanese
name "Takeshima", but were previously known to Japanese as "Matsushima" or the
"Rykano" islets.
Rival claims
Both Japan and Korea lay claim to Dokdo, and both claim a long
historical and geographical connection with the islets.
The Japanese Claim
The Japanese assert that they had incorporated Dokdo, an island
that they considered to be a terra nullius, into the Japanese Empire on
February 22, 1905 when the Govenor of Shimane prefecture proclaimed the islets
to be under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands branch office of the Shimane
prefectural government under the name "Takeshima", cited in Shimane
prefectural proclamation number 40 of that year. This action by the
Japanese government came about when, in September 1904, a Japanese fisherman
from Okinoshima (Oki Island) named Yozaburo Nakai
requested to be given exclusive rights to fish and hunt sealions in the area
of Dokdo (Nakai later recounted that he initially believed the island to be
Korean territory, and attempted to submit a request to the Government of
Korea, but was dissuaded of this idea by the Japanese Fisheries Bureau
Director, Maki Bokushin [...learn more]).
The fisherman also asked that he be given a ten-year lease of the island for
sea lion hunting. Officials in the Japanese Government took Nakai¢¥s
request one step further and appealed to the government for the formal
incorporation of the island. After having declared Dokdo (Takeshima) as
a part of Imperial Japan in February 1905, Japanese officials entered the
island¢¥s name in the State Land Register for Okinokuni, District 4 on May 17th
of that year.
Who
Was Nakai Yozaburo?
On June 5th, Yozaburo Nakai¢¥s
request came through when he and three others were given permission by the
Shimane prefectural government to hunt sea lions at Dokdo. In the year
that followed, the prefectural government posted a territorial sign and
conducted inspections and surveys of Dokdo. On April 24, 1939, a
decision to incorporate the island under the jurisdiction of Goka Village was
made by the Goka Village Assembly on Oki Island, Shimane Prefecture.
Imperial Japan had also made use of Dokdo in a military capacity, when they
named the islets "Maizaru" Naval Station on August 17, 1940, restricting the
island to purely military uses.
With Japan¢¥s defeat in the Pacific War
in 1945, the victorious Allied Powers renounced the Japanese claim to
Dokdo. Under U.S. military occupation (1945-1952), the highest
governmental authority in Japan was the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP), which delimited Japanese administrative territory.
SCAP¢¥s first major opinion concerning the territory of postwar Japan was cited
in an instruction SCAP gave to the Government of Occupied Japan. The
order, SCAPIN (SCAP instruction) #677 of January 29, 1946 specifically
outlined Japanese territory and stated that the islands disputed between Japan
and Korea- Utsuryo Island (Ullungdo), Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo), and Quelpart
Island (Chejudo) were to be excluded from Japan's administrative
authority. However, to SCAPIN 677 was added this caveat: "nothing in
this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating
to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of
the Potsdam Declaration." Dokdo¢¥s exclusion from Japan remained SCAP
policy throughout the occupation, (another instruction, SCAPIN 1033 of June
22, 1946, prohibited Japanese nationals from approaching within 12 miles of
Dokdo). With Dokdo¢¥s territorial status yet to be determined by a peace
treaty between Japan and the allied powers, U.S. authorities in Japan decided
to use the island as a bombing range.
In
June 1947, the Japanese Foreign Ministry appealed to the U.S. occupation
authorities over Japan's claim to sovereignty over both Ullungdo and Dokdo in
a treatise entitled, "Minor Islands in the Sea of Japan", hoping to influence
U.S. opinion in any future deliberations concerning the island that would take
place in the upcoming peace treaty negotiations. The Japanese ministers
denied Korea's ownership on the grounds that "no Korean name exists for the
island" and that Dokdo "is not shown on the maps made in Korea". The
Japanese document also argued that the settlers on the island had just arrived
recently and that the island¢¥s development was "still in an incipient stage",
and because of this, it was not within the Korean government¢¥s ability to
develop the island.
The location of Dokdo in relation to Korea and
Japan. |
The Japanese efforts to regain Dokdo during the negotiations of
the peace treaty eventually failed. Although the 1952 San Francisco
Peace Treaty between Japan and the former allied powers settled sovereignty
over the islands of Ullungdo, Kommundo, and Chejudo (all to Korea), the
ownership of Dokdo was not settled in the treaty.
The reasons for the
omission of Dokdo¢¥s sovereignty from the treaty are many. One important
reason why Dokdo¢¥s sovereignty was left unanswered by the peace treaty was
that the president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Yi Seung-man (Syngman Rhee)
did not effectively focus his government¢¥s attention on the ownership of Dokdo
when negotiating with U.S. authorities over Korea¢¥s territorial concerns.
The Korean president instead focused on an unrealistic demand for
Korean sovereignty over Tsushima Island (as a form of war reparations from
Japan, an idea which the drafters of the treaty never seriously entertained).
Much of his attention was also focused on suppressing domestic political
rivals than with maintaining his country¢¥s territory. In fact, the Rhee
government never bothered to produce a scholarly, well-documented study of the
Korean historical record on Dokdo that could offer the American drafters of
the peace treaty an alternative to the Japanese Foreign Ministry¢¥s monograph,
"Minor Islands in
the Sea of Japan".
Even after the peace treaty was signed and talks
on the normalization of relations between the ROK and Japan were underway, the
Korean demand for recognition of their country¢¥s sovereignty over Dokdo
continued. This was particularly the case after a bombing incident at
Dokdo on September 15, 1952 had raised awareness in Korea over the
impending fate of the island. Another development that heightened the
Dokdo issue in the minds of the Korean public was when the Korean president
announced the establishment of a territorial line (sometimes called the
Rhee-Line, or Peace Line) in the East Sea/Sea of Japan on January 18, 1952,
that encompassed Dokdo on Korea¢¥s side of this line. This growing demand from
Korea placed U.S. authorities in the region in the undesirable situation in
which the U.S. would have had to pick sides in a territorial dispute between
Korea and Japan, whose cooperation with the U.S. and each other, was important
to U.S. strategic designs. The documentary record shows that the
Americans increasingly attempted to distance themselves from the dispute.
U.S. Diplomatic
and Military History of Dokdo (1945-1952)
Dr. Pyun Yung-tai, Foreign Minister of the Republic of
Korea from 1951-1955. |
The only ROK high-official that tried to effectively campaign for
Korea¢¥s claim to Dokdo before the peace treaty went into effect was the
Foreign Minister, Pyun Yung-tai, who argued for Korean ownership of the islets
based largely on the decisions made by SCAP immediately after the Pacific War.
If it hadn¢¥t been for Dr. Pyun¢¥s efforts, Korea¢¥s stand on Dokdo might
never have been understood by influential U.S. officials, since other Korean
arguments for sovereignty over the island were neither clear nor consistent
during this period. Unfortunately for Korea, the American authorities
who made the decisions to exclude Japanese sovereignty over Dokdo at the
beginning of the occupation (the SCAP Headquarters Government Section), were
not the same Americans involved in drafting the territorial sovereignty
provisions in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Instead, American
judgements on these issues were largely governed by those in the Diplomatic
Section of SCAP, led by a great American friend of the Japanese Foreign
Ministry, William Sebald. As Acting Political Advisor in Japan
(essentially General MacArthur¢¥s acting "Foreign Minister"), Sebald¢¥s long
involvement in Japan and strong personal connections with Japanese officials
influenced his opinions towards the ownership of Dokdo, evident
in his communications to the US State Department. In the end,
however, the ownership of Dokdo was considered too contentious to handle, and
it was left out of the final draft of the peace treaty. Thus, the
failure of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to resolve the legal ownership of
Dokdo is a major reason why the rivalry over the island continues between
Japan and Korea.
Years later in 1966, the Japanese Foreign Ministry
produced an extensive study on the history of the island. This study,
Takeshima no rekishi chirigakuteki kenkyu (An Historical and
Geographical Study of Takeshima), was authored by a Foreign Ministry
researcher by the name of Kawakami Kenzo. The Foreign Ministry of Japan
has since used Kawakami¢¥s research as the Government of Japan¢¥s basis for its
claim to sovereignty over Dokdo. Kawakami attempted to show that
Koreans were not aware of the existence of the island. He asserted that
the island that Koreans cite in their Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) documents as
Dokdo simply does not exist. He also states that Dokdo is not visible
from Ullungdo and that Koreans did not have adequate navigation skills (until
the late 1800s, when Japanese people taught the Koreans proper sea navigation)
to reach Dokdo by boat, and therefore Koreans could not possibly have been
aware of the island. This is a very interesting assertion, since
Koreans travelled by boat from all points on Korea¢¥s east coast to Ullung
Island, but (according to Kawakami) somehow could not make the much shorter
trip from Ullungdo to Dokdo.
Based on the above precedents, Japan
still declares Dokdo to be within its territorial boundaries. The
Japanese still consider their 1905 incorporation of Dokdo into the Japanese
territorial sphere as legally binding. They also believe that previous
opinions of occupation authorities were made null and void by the 1952 peace
treaty. Since 1954, the government of Japan has been inviting the
Koreans to take the issue before the International Court of Justice.
The Koreans have consistently refused, stating that Dokdo is not a disputed
territory, but simply Korean territory.
To this day Dokdo is on
Japanese registers as a part of Goka Village, Oki-gun, Shimane Prefecture. The
Japanese government has even allowed their citizens to declare themselves
residents of the islets.
Why won't the Koreans agree
to take the Dokdo issue before the International Court of Justice?
The Korean Claim
The Koreans, however, lay their claim to Dokdo based on earlier
and more numerous precedents than Japan. They point to the document that
named it as a territory that was first incorporated into the Korean Shilla
Dynasty in 512 AD. They also point to various land surveys and maps that were
drawn in later centuries that do, in fact, show Dokdo (in its accurate
geographic position) to be Korean territory. Some of these documents
were even published in Japan: Japanese cartographer Dabuchi Tomohiko cited
Dokdo as Korean territory in "Kankoku Shinchishi (New Geography of Korea),
Teikoku Encyclopedia Number 134", published in September 1905; six months
after the islets were "incorporated" into Shimane Prefecture. In a
survey of Korea that was requested by the Colonial Government, Ihohara
Fumiichi referred to Dokdo as belonging to Korea. In a 1930 article,
Japanese scholar Hibata Sekko mentioned that Dokdo belonged to Kangwon
Province, Korea. The Japanese Navy had also cited Dokdo as an appended
island to Ullungdo, and Korean territory, in its 1923 publication, "Chosen
Engan Suiroshi" (Korean Coastal Straits).
Koreans also complain that
the Japanese took advantage of Korea's political weakness vis-a-vis Japan in
1905, when the islets were registered as a part of Shimane prefecture, Japan.
Koreans rightfully argue that Korea had not been able to effectively
protest the Japanese action at the time because Japan had had already taken
control of the foreign affairs of Korea via the Protectorate Treaty of 1905,
also known as the "Eulsa Treaty" or the "Second Japan-Korea Agreement".
(The ratification of the treaty itself had been forced on Korea by the
Japanese delegation to the treaty "negotiations" led by Ito Hirobumi and
General Hasegawa Gonnosuke, with no signatures given by either the King or the
Prime Minister of Korea.) The Korean side also points out that the
Japanese did not inform the Korean Government of their claim until 1906, and
then only indirectly. Upon learning of Japan¢¥s decision, Korean
officials in 1906, at both local and national levels, did in fact
recognize and document the Japanese action as a violation of Korean
sovereignty. However, due to the loss their nation¢¥s independence and
foreign affairs capability, no action was taken. Currently, the
Japanese Foreign Ministry website states that it was not necessary for Japan
to inform other countries of this territorial acquisition. This
contrasts sharply with Japan's action when it acquired the Bonin (Ogasawa)
Islands in the Pacific. Then Japan contacted Great Britain and the U.S.
several times, which were only remotely involved in them and it notified 12
European countries of its establishment of control over the islands.
To bolster their claim to Dokdo, Koreans also point to the opinions
SCAP rendered on no less than three occasions during the occupation that
excluded Dokdo from Japanese control.
This photo clearly calls into question the argument
made by Kawakami Kenzo that Koreans on Ullung Island, ¢¥were not aware of
the existence of Dokdo since the island could not be seen from Ullungdo
due to the thick vegetation on
Ullungdo.¢¥ |
Historical
Context: 1870s-1905
Conflicts in
the 1950s
Koreans have also pointed out the falsehoods in the Japanese
Foreign Ministry-sponsored 1966 study by Kawakami Kenzo. Kawakami¢¥s
disparagement of Korean Choson Dynasty documentation has been shown to be
baseless. Futhermore, the claim that Dokdo was not (is not) visible to
Korean eyes on Ullungdo is also a falsehood, since Dokdo is visible at a
height of 120 meters or higher in elevation from Ullungdo, an island with a
maximum elevation of 985 meters.
Japanese have also made claims that
Japan¢¥s "effective management" of Dokdo had been in place as early as the 17th
Century, when the Japanese merchant families Otani and Murakawa obtained
permission from the Japanese Government to travel to Ullungdo. Not only was
Japan¢¥s "effective management" of Dokdo highly improbable at this time (the
merchant families were interested in exploiting Ullungdo, not Dokdo), it also
creates a contradiction in the Japanese claim. In 1905, the Japanese
recognized the islets as a terra nullius, and therefore ownerless
(never having been managed) before that time. This contradiction has
never been fully addressed by official or unofficial sources in Japan.
Probably as a result of this contradiction, the Japanese
Foreign Ministry Website no longer mentions the fact that Japan
incorporated Dokdo as a terra nullius.
Yet another problematic issue for the Japanese claim to Dokdo,
particularly Japan¢¥s 1905 ¢¥incorporation¢¥, is the existence of a land survey
conducted by Korean authorities in 1900, known as
Korean Government Imperial Ordinance No. 41 (Article 2), which stipulated
that the Ullungdo-kun office was to have jurisdiction over Sokdo (Dokdo).
This Korean Government order was promulgated on October 25, 1900; over
four whole years before Japan sequestered the island as a terra
nullius. Japanese critics of this ordinance assert that the island
named in the document, Sokdo (in Sino-Korean characters), is not Dokdo, but
refers to the island Kwanumdo; an island that is almost penninsular in
appearance and in the far Northeastern corner of Ullungdo. The evidence
by which they conclude that Sokdo is Kwanumdo has never been explained.
It is difficult to believe that Sokdo is Kwanumdo, based on Kwanumdo¢¥s
history, appearance and topography, and as "Dokdo" and "Sokdo" essentially
mean the same thing: "rock island". As the text of the ordinance was
written in Sino-Korean (Chinese) characters, the name appears as "Sok", and
not the dialectal pure Korean, "Dok".
Therefore, despite the seemingly "legal" aspects of Japan¢¥s
incorporation of Dokdo into the metropolitan area of Japan, the Japanese
action must be seen from an historical point of view. It must be
remembered that Dokdo was annexed together with the rest of Korea, when Japan
extended its Empire over the former Korean state in the period, 1900-1910.
Japan¢¥s ¢¥acquistion¢¥ of Dokdo resulted from an overall increase in
Japanese aggression in Korea in the late 1800s, when Japan began to openly
acquire monetary rights, railway, mining, and fishing concessions in Korea, in
addition to conducting outright invasions of Korea¢¥s outlying islands.
At first, when Japanese civilians began exploiting Korean islands like
Ullungdo in the late 1800s, the Japanese Government acquiesed to Korean
Government complaints and removed Japanese civilians who were illegally
fishing and logging. The Japanese Dajokan, the Council of State, even
ruled in 1877 that "our
country has nothing to do with" Ullungdo and Dokdo .
However, the Japanese position changed after the Sino-Japanese
(1894-1895) and Russo-Japanese
(1904-1905) Wars, when these Japanese victories boosted Japan¢¥s
willingness and power to control the areas just outside of territorial Japan.
The Korean islands in this area of the East Sea/Sea of Japan (Kommundo,
Chejudo, Ullungdo and Dokdo) were seen to have value to the Japanese military
in the Russo-Japanese War, and the Japanese military essentially invaded these
sovereign Korean territories to establish watchtowers and to link them via
submarine telegraph cables. It was also during this war with Russia
that the Japanese public began to become aware of Dokdo, since many of the
naval battles between the Russian and Japanese fleets took place in the area
of Ullungdo and Dokdo. Previously illegal Japanese civilian
encroachment in this sea area (and indeed the rest of the Korean peninnsula)
was encouraged by the Japanese Government in this period. It was in
this milieu of Japanese imperialist advance into Korea that Nakai Yozaburo
approached the Japanese Government to secure exclusive rights to Dokdo,
resulting in the Japanese acquisition of the islets.
Therefore, the
Japanese incorporation of Dokdo into Shimane Prefecture was intimately
connected to, and a result of, Japan¢¥s imperialist aggression in the early
20th Century. However, the Foreign Ministry of Japan still
clings to its belief that the territories it acquired in the period of
1894-1910 were "internationally recognized", and therefore were acquired
validly. It is quite curious that Japan continues to hold onto a claim
of territorial sovereignty that was enacted at a time when Japan was engaged
in imperial expansion.
A final thought on this issue...
The
Cairo Conference of 1943 stipulated that "Japan will be expelled from all
territories which she has taken by violence and greed [since the time of the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95]." Considering Japan¢¥s methods, there can be
little doubt that Japan¢¥s annexation of Dokdo in 1905 (along with all other
Korean territories by 1910) falls within the definition of territories taken
by greed, as defined by the Cairo Declaration. If Japan
believes that its methods in acquiring Dokdo in 1905 were legitimate, then
Japan must believe that it can still, by the same logic, claim sovereignty
over the rest of the Korean Peninnsula...
In the 1950's, South Korea took active measures to stake its
claim. The first was in September 1952, when then president Yi
Seung-man (Syngman Rhee) sent a research vessel to Dokdo (resulting in the
aforementioned bombing incident), causing the territorial dispute to capture
the public's attention in Korea and Japan for the first
time.
Korean coast guards stationed at Dokdo in the 1950s.
They maintained the Republic of Korea¢¥s control over the islets, and
engaged any Japanese vessels that entered the surrounding
waters. |
The conflict over dokdo escalated considerably in 1953 and 1954,
beginning with ROK president Syngman Rhee¢¥s establishment of the "Peace Line"
or "Rhee Line" on January 18, 1952, in which South Korea placed a territorial
boundary line that extended out into the East Sea/Sea of Japan to encompass
Dokdo: Much to the chagrin of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Over
the next two years, Japanese patrol vessels would approach within close
distance of the island and attempt to, and sometimes actually land on the
island. These patrols would provoke reactions from the Korean volunteer
coast guards, who kept watch over Dokdo since being stationed there on April
20, 1953 and led by Korean War hero, Hong Soon-chil. In an incident on
June 27, 1953 crews of two Japanese coast guard vessels, led by Tomizo Sawa
and Nobuo Igawa, drove six of the Korean coast guards from their base on the
East Islet to the West Islet, landed on the island, and erected a Japanese
territorial marker on the shore. This action had little effect in
Korea, since most of the government¢¥s focus was on events concerning the end
of the Korean War. However, it was not forgotten by the president of
Korea, when a year later, he sent a letter to North Kyongsang Province police
chief Kim Jong-won, promising him a shipment of mortars and 100 rounds of
mortar bombs for the Dokdo coast guards so that the weapons could be used to
"scare off" intruding Japanese ships. When issuing the orders, however,
the provincial police chief changed the wording of the president¢¥s orders from
allowing the coast guards to "scare off" Japanese ships, to allowing them to
"sink" Japanese ships. On July 12, 1953, three Japanese patrol boats
(two of which were named the ¢¥Hekura-ho¢¥ and ¢¥Oki-ho¢¥) arrived to stage their
typical show of force. Upon arriving at Dokdo, the Japanese ships came
under mortar fire from the Korean forces on Dokdo. The ships returned
fire, but the Japanese lost one boat and suffered 16 casualties, including a
number of deaths. Yet another such incident occurred on August 24,
1954.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry angrily denounced the Korean
"illegal actions" in a letter to Seoul on November 30th. The Japanese
demanded an official apology from the ROK and the removal of the Korean coast
guard from the island. The Koreans did not give in. It was at
this time that Japanese right-wing groups discussed plans to assemble an armed
reaction force in an effort to "free Takeshima" from the Koreans. In
the end, this incident only really served to heighten the animosities felt by
either side and undoubtedly slowed down rapprochement between Korea and
Japan.
In 1954, the Koreans had also built a concrete lighthouse and
building, and a helicopter landing pad on the East Islet The islets have
remained under the protection of Korean maritime guards ever
since.
Despite these setbacks for their claim, Japan has officially
declared several times since 1949 that Dokdo is a part of Japan, with South
Korea protesting against this territorial claim time after time.
Dokdo in the 1965 R.O.K./Japan Basic Relations Treaty
Korean Foreign Minister Lee Dong-won (left) and the
Japanese Foreign Minister, Etsusaburo Shiina reviewing ROK troops at Kimpo
Airport upon Shiina¢¥s arrival in Korea to negotiate the 1965 Normalisation
Treaty between the ROK and
Japan. |
The dispute over Dokdo hindered the normalization of diplomatic
relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) from the end of the
Pacific War in 1945, to June 1965 when the Basic Relations Treaty was signed
between Japan and the R.O.K. As with the 1952 San Francisco Peace
Treaty, sovereignty over Dokdo was deliberately left out of the eventual text
of the treaty upon request of the Korean side. Nevertheless, Dokdo
was discussed in conversations
between ROK Foreign Minister Lee Dong-won and Japanese Foreign Minister
Etsusaburo Shiina. The normalisation of relations with Japan was not
popular among the Korean public, who demanded a definite territorial boundary
between Korea and Japan (known as the ¢¥peace line¢¥, or ¢¥Rhee line¢¥), war
reparations from Japan, and ownership of Dokdo on Korea's side of the peace
line. Therefore, even the treaty of 1965 did not resolve the
ownership of Dokdo between the two nations.
The American
position regarding Dokdo (although it might have been different
in the past) is essentially one of "non-recognition" of both Korea¢¥s and
Japan¢¥s claims to sovereignty over the islets. The U.S. has taken this
stance since it maintains defense pacts with both the Republic of Korea and
Japan. In the Japanese case, the U.S. takes into account the fact that
the Japanese do not control the islands, thus placing them outside the
territory governed by the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty. In regard
to Korea¢¥s claim, it is unlikely that the U.S. would recognize Korea¢¥s claim
to the island based on the known history of the dispute. As such, the Mutual
Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the ROK would also appear to be
inapplicable since the treaty commits the U.S. to defend only that territory
recognized by the U.S. as belonging to Seoul.
Right-wing groups in Japan protest against Korean
policy regarding Dokdo. |
Recent Conflicts
The most serious recent row over the Islets came in February 1996
when Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda publicly reaffirmed Japan's
territorial claim to the islets after South Korea made plans to build a wharf
on them. Certain Japanese ministry officials such as Ikeda, Miyaki and
others occasionally make such statements in order to garnish more popularity
among Japanese voters by sounding 'tough', regardless of how such behavior
upsets neighboring countries. In this case, the Korean defense ministry
had had decided to cancel that year's spring military maneuvers near Dokdo to
avoid political friction, but changed back to their original plans after Ikeda
made his statement. Some time later, the Japanese "self-defense" forces
conducted exercises in the same ocean that were meant to practice the
re-occupation of an island. Japan then later renamed the military drill
a `landing exercise' for fear of an overly negative reaction from Korea.
To Koreans, there was little doubt about what the Japanese forces were
really practicing.
There has also been the constant controversy
over Japan¢¥s refusal to acknowledge the full history of the sovereignty
dispute over Dokdo (in addition to other issues) in history textbooks
published for Japanese high schools. In April 2002, the Japanese
Ministry of Culture and Science approved texts from the book publishing
companies, Meiseisha and Jitkyosha, that question the Korean claim to Dokdo
without even attempting to explain the Korean argument. Such refusals
by Japanese officials to even consider the existence of Korean claims to the
islets in histories written in Japan reflect the Japanese resistance to
attaining closure with their Korean neighbors over the Dokdo island dispute.
It also shows just how much Japanese attitudes have yet to mature on
this issue.
Negotiation
The Korean flag flies at Dokdo. The Chinese characters
declare Dokdo to be Korean
land. |
This conflict between Japan and Korea is not just about the
ownership of the two islets. Both countries consider the ownership of
Dokdo as an anchor for their respective interests in the surrounding
waters. At stake are claims to about 16,600 square nautical miles of sea
and seabed, including areas that may hold some 600 million tons of gas hydrate
(natural gas condensed into semisolid form). This gas hydrate is
believed to be deposited along the broad seabed extending from Dokdo to
Guryongpo, North Kyongsang Province. Gas hydrate is a next-generation energy
source that could be made into liquid natural gas if adequate technology is
made available. The island is surrounded by fertile fishing grounds,
and both sides frequently attempt to bolster their claims to it. Also
spurring the fishing competition is a fear of dwindling sea resources.
Japanese fishing officials say the depletion of fish stocks in other parts of
the world means their country must rely more on waters closer to home.
The northwestern Pacific in general has more underused fish stocks than other
areas, according to the U.N.
Today, few marine areas in East Asia
remain unclaimed-and many claims overlap. The global Law of the Sea
Convention, which entered into force in November 1994 after more than 20 years
of negotiation, embodies most international law and state practice relating to
the oceans. Under the treaty, every nation with a seacoast is entitled
to exercise jurisdiction over resources and certain activities in waters
extending as much as 200 nautical miles from a coastal baseline-an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). The problems here lie in the details, and this is
nowhere better illustrated than in the Law of the Sea Convention, in which the
extent and degree of jurisdiction a nation exercises is determined by a host
of arcane factors, including the drawing of baselines, distance from the
coast, and the meaning of "continental shelf," "equidistant lines," and the
like.
According to the convention, a nation can claim sovereign rights
over resources and all related activities, as well as jurisdiction over
artificial structures, scientific research, and protection and preservation of
the marine environment, within its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ). But because tiny islets that are only flyspecks on a map may be
used as a basis to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone, many maritime disputes
focus on the ownership of tiny islands, reefs, and other "features" such as
Dokdo, the Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, and the Spratly/Xisha Islands
in the South China Sea. Unfortunately, the convention offers little
specific guidance for the settlement of boundary disputes. Thus nations may
still feel a need to engage in provocative military posturing, and the
possibility of military conflict remains.
The 1996 dispute over Dokdo
only further stressed the already fragile relations between South Korea and
Japan. Nonetheless, ways have been found to deal with boundary
uncertainty. Under a joint-development approach, these countries agree
on the extent of the area in dispute, set aside the actual boundary question,
and reach agreement on joint exploration and exploitation of
hydrocarbons. This strategy is supported by the Law of the Sea
Convention, which stipulates that, pending agreement on the delineation of the
continental shelf or the boundaries of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), states
should try to enter into provisional arrangements. Perhaps the strongest
reason for a state to opt for a joint undertaking is to protect its interests
in potential oil or gas deposits, combined with a desire to maintain good
relations with the other state. Joint development is an idea that may
look increasingly attractive as the need for oil intensifies. Japan and
South Korea have taken such an approach, and have established 230-mile EEZs
under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. After years of
negotiation, the two countries signed the treaty in July 1996, setting quotas
and regulations in each other's zones.
Continuing Anger
Protesters set fire to a Japanese flag written 'In
memory of Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda' during a rally in
front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, February 12, 1996, as they
condemned Japan's claim to Dokdo. They took to the streets days after
Ikeda reaffirmed Japan's territorial claim to the
island. |
However, not everyone is happy. Many Koreans were angered
by the provisions of the convention, which meant that Korea had to share some
of its sea space near Dokdo. Many felt that Korea had "given into" the
Japanese. Other developments have also shocked Koreans. Recently, in an
Asian Executive Poll conducted by the Review and Asia Business News, the
majority of business leaders and the general public in 8 out of 12 Asian
countries who participated in the poll believed that Japan, not Korea, had the
stronger claim to the Dokdo islets. Many Koreans see this as another
example of "gross negligence" on the part of their government. Partly
because of this, Korean citizens have taken to the internet to assert Korea's
claim to Dokdo. Countless Korean Dokdo websites and web-boards have come
online. Koreans have also been hacking into, and disrupting Japanese
webservers that harbor pro-Japanese Dokdo websites. Almost all domain
names related to Dokdo are controlled by Koreans. Dokdo related domain
names such as 'liancourt.org', 'tokdo.com', 'tokdo.co.kr', 'takeshima.com',
'takeshima.net', 'takeshima.org', 'takeshima.co.kr', 'tokdo.net' and
'takeshima.net' were all snatched up by Koreans almost in the minutes
immediately after they became available. In cyberspace, Dokdo is
entirely Korean territory.
|
Some Japanese wax nostalgic for their imperialist
past. |
The resolution of the dispute over Dokdo is still uncertain.
Despite the agreement the two countries entered into in 1996, Japanese
officials still make remarks that anger people in Korea, and Korean voices are
getting increasingly indignant over the issue. However, governments
outside of Japan and Korea really have no interest in getting involved in the
issue. In cases like this, possession is nine-tenths of the law.
Therefore, Dokdo will probably remain in Korean hands; That is unless the
Right Wing in Japan takes over and/or the Japanese pacifist constitution is
rewritten to accommodate a Japanese military take-over of the Islets.
In Conclusion...
To conclude, a quote from one of the contributors to
the Guestbook is quite appropriate:
"...a war over
Dokdo would be insane for both countries involved, and Japan in particular
(because given the situation on the ground, it would have to start it). Which
means if rational decision making is in play, this issue will be solved when
one of the two -- probably Japan -- finally decides to throw in the towel.
Until that time, this issue will continue to [hinder] bilateral relations
until people in Tokyo decide to get smart and cut their losses."
Recommended
Reading: Kazuo Hori, "Japan's Incorporation of Takeshima into
Its Territory in 1905" in the English-language journal, KOREA
OBSERVER, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, Autumn 1997.
(Originally published in
Japanese in Chosenshi kenkyukai ronbunshu "A Collection of Articles
on Korean History", No. 24, Tokyo, 1987)
NEW UPDATES ON DOKDO:
LINKS:
The Party for Dokdo Protection "Allied powers recognized Korea's sovereignty over Dokdo: U.S. documents" by Korea NowOverall History of Dokdo
by Professor Shin
Yong-ha of Seoul National University:
"Japan¢¥s Position on Takeshima"-from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
LINKS to My Other Sites and Pages of Interest
The Obituary of Kim Seung Ok, maker of the first Korean documentary on Dokdo
Korean Coast Guards and their Sapsaree guard dogs keep a watchful eye over Dokdo.
Sign
Guestbook
This research compiled by Mark S. Lovmo